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Comments
Living Will Statutes: A Proposal For
Kentucky
INTRODUCTION
Recent breakthroughs in medical technology have resulted in
indefinitely prolonging lives1 of wholly or partially "brain dead ' 2
patients. The numerous medical, ethical and legal problems cre-
ated by these accomplishments, however, must be addressed.3
The living will,4 statutorily adopted by a majority of states,5
is one method of dealing with these problems. The statutory
I In re L.H.R., 321 S.E.2d 716, 722 (Ga. 1984); Superintendent of Belchertown
State School v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 423 (Mass. 1977); In re Conroy, 486 A.2d
1209, 1220 (N.J. 1985).
Some technological advances which enable the medical profession to prolong life
are respirators, heart-lung machines, pacemakers, artificial or transplanted organs, he-
modialysis and drug therapy. Comment, Living Wills-A Need for Statewide Legislation
or a Federally Recognized Right?, 1983 DET. C.L. RE. 781, 781 n.1 (1983) [hereinafter
Comment, Living Wills-A Need for Statewide Legislation]; Comment, The Living Will:
Already a Practical Alternative, 55 TEx. L. Ray. 665, 666 (1977).
2 Although the definition of brain death is one controversial aspect of the right
to die issue, this issue is beyond the scope of this Comment. The author suggests,
however, that the best definition of brain death is the Uniform Determination of Death
Act, developed and proposed by the American Bar Association, the American Medical
Association, and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.
The definition follows: "An individual who has sustained either (1) irreversible cessation
of circulatory and respiratory functions, or (2) irreversible cessation of all functions of
the entire brain, including the brain stem, is dead. A determination of death must be
made in accordance with accepted medical standards." PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE
STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAvioiL RESEARCH,
DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE SUSTAINING TREATMENt 9 n.7 (1983) [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S
COMMISSION REPORT].
See 321 S.E.2d at 722; 370 N.E.2d at 423; In re Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332, 341
(Minn. 1984); Note, The "Living Will": The Right to Death With Dignity?, 26 CASE.
W. REs. 485, 486 (1975-76); Comment, Living Wills-A Need for Statewide Legislation,
supra note 1, at 781-82.
4 "Living will" describes a document whereby a person can direct in advance that
life support systems shall be terminated in the event that the patient is in a terminal
condition. It is, in effect, a recognition of the right to die. The term living will was first
used by Luis Kutner in 1969. See Martyn & Jacobs, Legislating Advance Directives for
the Terminally Ill: The Living Will and Durable Power of Attorney, 63 NEB. L. REv.
779, 787 (1984).
1 See note 80 infra.
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method of dealing with the "right to die ' 6 issue seems to be the
best approach to the problem.7 The Kentucky legislature has
failed to address this issue,8 leaving the decision of whether or
not to continue life support systems to physicians and family
members who may not know the wishes of a particular patient. 9
Questions surrounding a person's right to choose whether or
not to die and whether living wills should be given legal effect
through statutes are emotional issues. 10 The emotions of individ-
6 The question of whether a person has the "right to die" has been debated
extensively on both moral and legal grounds. See, e.g., S. SmNmaa, THE LAw IN
MEDICAL PRACTICE 116-118 (1966); Elkinton, The Dying Patient, the Doctor, and the
Law, 13 VtL. L. REv. 740 (1968); Gelfand, Euthanasia and the Terminally Il Patient,
63 NEB. L. REv. 741 (1984); Kamisar, Some Non-Religious Views Against Proposed
"Mercy Killing" Legislation, 42 MINN. L. REv. 969 (1958); Kutner, Due Process of
Euthanasia: The Living Will, a Proposal, 44 IND. L.J. 539 (1969).
7 See 486 A.2d at 1220-21; Note, The Tragic Choice: Termination of Care for
Patients in a Permanent Vegetative State, 51 N.Y.U.L. REv. 285, 297 (1976) (legislatures
better suited to balance interests in determining whether to permit termination of care);
Comment, Living Wills-A Need for Statewide Legislation, supra note 1, at 825. Contra
Martyn & Jacobs, supra note 4.
1 Living will bills have been presented to the Kentucky Legislature for consider-
ation in each of the last three meetings of the general assembly.
The Kentucky General Assembly meets for sixty legislative days beginning on the
first Tuesday after the first Monday in January of even-numbered years. KY. CONST. §§
36, 42. The next scheduled meeting of the general assembly is January, 1988.
During the most recent session of the general assembly (January, 1986), HB138
(BR 143) sponsored by Gerta Bendl, D-Louisville, was presented to the Judicial-Civil
Committee on January 8. The bill was posted in Committee on February 4. On February
13, after testimony was given by both sides, the vote was tied on whether to send the
bill to the House for consideration and so the posting was withdrawn. The bill never
got the consideration and debate of the full House of Representatives. 17 LEGIs. RECORD
60 (daily ed. April 15, 1986).
9 In the case of an individual who has not expressed his wishes in the event that
he is unable to make decisions for himself, the family is faced with a difficult decision,
at an even more difficult time. Not only is it possible that physicians and/or family
members may guess wrong about the patient's true wishes, it is additionally possible
that the patient's true wishes could be deliberately frustrated. Many physicians are afraid
of possible civil or criminal liability and thus are unwilling to make the decision for the
patient. In the absence of some legally enforceable expression of the patient's wishes, it
is possible for a family that knows the patient would not want to be kept alive by
extraordinary means to keep the patient alive by not divulging the patient's true wishes.
"0 There are groups on each side of the issue who spend much time and effort
lobbying for their cause. In Kentucky the chief opponent of such a law is the Kentucky
Right to Life Association. Lexington Herald-Leader, Apr. 5, 1986, at BI, col. 1. The
issue is an emotional one because it deals with a very difficult subject: death. Kutner,
The Living Will-Coping With the Historical Event of Death, 27 BAYLOR L. REv. 39,
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ual legislators and third-parties, however, should not prevent the
legislative adoption of a policy based on facts concerning living
wills and the legal effects of those documents."
This Comment addresses some of the issues that the Ken-
tucky legislature and other state legislatures may face in adopting
a living will statute. The first section presents arguments for and
against adoption of such a statute. The second section examines
relevant portions of other state statutes and offers a model
statute (based on these other statutes and the author's own
opinions) for adoption by the Kentucky legislature.
I. REASONS FOR AND AGAINST A STATUTE
A. The Right of Privacy
The right of privacy is not expressly enunciated in the United
States Constitution. While the source of this right has been a
matter of considerable disagreement among members of the
Supreme Court, a majority of the Court consistently has agreed
that the right to personal privacy does exist. The concept was
first enunciated in Justice Brandeis's dissent in Olmstead v.
39 (1975) ("Ever since recorded humankind there have been reflections on death and
the continuity of life .... Anthropologically every culture has cultivated a pornography
of death .... Discussion of death and the life cycle are taboo to the advocates of
symbolic immortality."); Comment, The Right to Die: An Extension of the Right to
Privacy, 18 JoHN MmRSHALL L. Rv. 895, 896 (1984-85) ("In a life-oriented society the
expression of a desire to die is often controversial and misunderstood.").
" The Kentucky Right to Life Association generally has kept a high profile in
lobbying the Kentucky General Assembly. The organization has been fairly successful in
encouraging passage of legislation that comports with its viewpoint. The group, however,
usually has engaged in lobbying tactics that involve the use of highly emotional charges.
For example, in testifying at the Judiciary-Civil Committee hearing on the living will
bill, the Right to Life group "argued that living wills would give physicians a license to
kill their patients." Lexington Herald-Leader, Feb. 16, 1986, at F2, col. 1. The living
will statutes passed by a majority of states and the bill proposed by Gerta Bendl do not
give physicians a "license to kill." These charges merely detract from the real facts and
issues that should be considered by the legislators. The living will does not give physicians
a "license to kill" for a number of reasons: First, the decision to terminate treatment
is not made by the physician. The patient, through the living will, exercises his right to
die and the physician merely follows his patient's treatment decision. Second, physicians
are not "killing," they are "allowing patients to die naturally." It is implausible that
physicians, after taking an oath to heal, will run rampant and kill patients, simply
because a living will statute is enacted.
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United States.12 He stated: "The makers of our Constitution
•.. sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts,
their emotions, and their sensations. They conferred, as against
the Government, the right to be let alone-the most comprehen-
sive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.' ' 3
Thirty-seven years later the United States Supreme Court
expressly recognized the right to privacy in Griswold v. Con-
necticut.14 The Griswold case dealt with a Connecticut statute
which forbade the use of contraceptives by married couples and
made it a crime to distribute birth control information. The
Court invalidated the statute as an undue infringement of a
"zone of privacy,"' 5 and, therefore, impermissible absent some
compelling state interest. Although the justices did not agree on
the source of the right to privacy, a majority believed it existed
in the "penumbra" of provisions in the Bill of Rights. 6
The right to privacy was expanded by the United States
Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade. 7 In Roe the Court held that,
within certain limits, 18 a woman has the right to decide whether
or not to have an abortion. The Court held that the woman's
right to make this choice stemmed from her right of privacy and
found this right of privacy in the Fourteenth Amendment's
concept of liberty. 19
The right of privacy was subsequently extended to protect
an individual's decision to forego or terminate life sustaining
medical treatment.20 This extension of the right of privacy was
12 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
11 Id. at 478.
'" 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
" Id. at 484.
16 Id. at 482-85 (provisions in the Bill of Rights included the first, fourth, fifth,
and ninth amendments).
' 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
'8 Under the Roe decision a woman is limited in her ability to choose to have an
abortion according to the trimester of pregnancy. During the first trimester the state
cannot interfere in the decision, during the second trimester the state may regulate
abortions in order to protect maternal health, and during the third trimester the state
may prohibit abortions altogether. Id. at 163-64.
'9 Id. at 153-54.
20 Tune v. Walter Reed Army Medical Hosp., 602 F. Supp. 1452 (D.D.C. 1985)
(extending the right to patients in federal facilities); Foody v. Manchester Memorial
Hosp., 482 A.2d 713 (Conn. 1984); Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
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first recognized by the New Jersey Supreme Court in the well-
known case In re Quinlan.2' In this case, Karen Quinlan was
declared to be in a "chronic vegetative state" by her physicians22
Her father, as guardian, petitioned the court to allow him to
terminate the medical procedures that were sustaining her life.
23
The New Jersey court, recognizing the right to privacy, allowed
the father to order the termination of her life support systems.
The court held: "[the right to privacy] is broad enough to
encompass a patient's decision to decline medical treatment un-
der certain circumstances."24
Other courts followed the Quinlan decisionY In re Conroy,
a recent New Jersey decision, extended the right of privacy to
include the ability to decline life sustaining treatment.26 The
Conroy court held that life sustaining treatment may be withheld
or withdrawn from an incompetent patient when it is clear that
the particular patient, if competent, would have refused the
treatment under the circumstances. 27 The court, however, rec-
ognized that the right is not absolute and must be weighed
against competing state interests. "Courts and commentatorsn
have commonly identified four state interests that may limit a
person's right to refuse medical treatment: preserving life; pre-
App. 1978); In re L.H.R., 321 S.E.2d 716 (Ga. 1984); Brophy v. New England Sinai
Hosp., Inc., 497 N.E.2d 626 (Mass. 1986); In re Spring, 405 N.E.2d 115 (Mass. 1980);
Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977);
In re Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332 (Minn. 1984); In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985);
In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981).
21 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976).
2 Id. at 654. The phrase "chronic vegetative state" is defined by Dr. Fred Plum,
a medical expert in the Quinlan case, as a state in which there is a "capacity to maintain
the vegetative parts of neurological function but [the patient] ... no longer has any
cognitive function." Id.
Id. at 653.
14 Id. at 663.
2 See note 20 supra.
6 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985).
Id. at 1229.
- The Conroy court identifies the following sources supporting its position: 362
So. 2d at 162; 405 N.E.2d at 123; Commissioner of Correction v. Myers, 399 N.E.2d
452, 456 (Mass. 1979); 370 N.E.2d at 425; 357 N.W.2d at 339; In re Colyer, 660 P.2d
738, 743 (Wash. 1983); PansDEN~r's CommsisON REPORT, supra note 2, at 31-32; Note,




venting suicide; safeguarding the integrity of the medical profes-
sion; and protecting innocent third parties. "29
Preserving life is the most compelling and significant state
interest.a0 "It may be seen as embracing two separate but related
concerns: an interest in preserving the life of the particular
patient, and an interest in preserving the sanctity of all life." '31
These concerns are strong, but unless there is an interest in
preserving the life of someone other than the patient, the state's
interest in preserving life will usually succumb to the patient's
much stronger right of free choice and self-determination.3 2
Many states have an interest in preventing suicide.3 3 This
interest is arguably an extension of the interest in preserving
life. 34 There is a difference between committing an act of suicide
and refusing medical treatment.3 5 A person who refuses medical
treatment "may fervently wish to live," but would like "to do
so free of unwanted medical technology, surgery or drugs. ' 36
When making the decision to terminate or refuse medical treat-
ment, the patient is not committing an act of suicide but "merely
allows the disease to take its natural course .... "-37 This refusal
9 486 A.2d at 1223. See also 482 A.2d at 718; 497 N.E.2d at 634.
30 486 A.2d at 1223.
31 Id.
32 370 N.E.2d at 426-27.
33 Suicide was a felony at common law, punishable by forfeiture of the goods
and chattels of the offender and the ignominious burial of his body in the
highway. In some jurisdictions it is still considered a felony or a crime and
the incidents of a criminal act may follow therefrom. In other jurisdictions,
however, suicide itself is not a crime and is not punishable as such....
83 C.J.S. Suicide § 2 (1953). "If the act of suicide fails to accomplish its purpose, it
constitutes an attempt to commit suicide, which is unlawful and criminal, and an
indictable offense both at common law and under some statutes." 83 C.J.S. Suicide §
3 (1953).
14 486 A.2d at 1224 (state's interest in preventing suicide motivated by interest in
protecting life).
3S "The difference is between self-infliction or self-destruction and self-determi-
nation." Id.
36 Id. (citing 362 So. 2d at 162-63; 370 N.E.2d at 426 n.11).
37 Id. This distinction most often is termed as the difference between euthanasia
and antidysthanasia. Euthanasia "has been defined as the taking of positive action to
end the life of an incurable patient," whereas "fa]ntidysthanasia has been defined as
the 'failure to take positive action to prolong the life of an incurable patient with
intractable pain.' " Note, supra note 3, at 487 (quoting SHNDELL, supra note 6, at 118).
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clearly differentiates the termination decision from suicide be-
cause if death eventually occurs, it will be the result of natural
causes, not self-inflicted injury. 8
The third interest often asserted by states is preservation of
the integrity of the medical profession. 39 Surveys indicate, how-
ever, that a majority of doctors approve of "passive euthana-
sia", ° and believe it is being practiced by members of their
profession.41 Physicians are not required by any standards or
rules of ethics to intervene at all costs to save a patient's life.
42
Accord Note, Statutory Recognition of the Right to Die: The California Natural Death
Act, 57 B.U.L. REv. 148 (1977) [hereinafter Note, Statutory Recognition]; Note, Vol-
untary Active Euthanasia for the Terminally Ill and the Constitutional Right to Privacy,
69 CoRNELL L. REv. 363 (1984). But see Comment, The Right to Die, 7 Hous. L. Rnv.
654, 659 (1969-70) ("[I]t is submitted that once life support equipment has begun to
operate on a patient, it is falacious [sic] to argue that a cessation of such treatment is
a mere 'omission to provide therapeutic treatment' and is not an 'act' in a legal sense.").
[1 IT]he underlying State interest in [preventing suicide] lies in the preven-
tion of irrational self destruction. What we consider here is a competent,
rational decision to refuse treatment when death is inevitable and the
treatment offers no hope of cure or preservation of life. There is no
connection between the conduct here in issue and any state concern to
prevent suicide.
370 N.E.2d at 426 n.11 (citation omitted). See also 362 So. 2d at 162-63; 486 A.2d at
1224.
" 486 A.2d at 1224.
• See note 37 supra (distinguishing "passive euthanasia" (antidysthanasia) from
active euthanasia (euthanasia)).
11 486 A.2d at 1225. See Levisohn, Voluntary Mercy Deaths, 8 J. FOR MED. 57,
68 (1961) (61 percent of physicians surveyed believed euthanasia was practiced by
members of profession); Travis, Noyes & Brightwell, The Attitudes of Physicians Toward
Prolonging Life, 5 INT'L. J. OF PSYCHIATRY IN MED. 18, 19 (1974) (44 percent of
respondents frequently omitted life prolonging procedures and medications and 47 per-
cent said they would be more inclined to do so if the patient had signed a statement
that prolonging measures should not be used); Euthanasia, 218(1) J. A.M.A. 249 (1971)
(80 percent of physicians questioned practiced euthanasia); Euthanasia Questions Stir
New Debate, Med. World News, Sept. 14, 1973, at 75 (87 percent of respondents to a
poll done by the Association of American Physicians approved passive euthanasia).
486 A.2d at 1224.
Prevailing medical practice does not, without exception, demand that
all efforts toward life prolongation be made in all circumstances. Rather,
as indicated in Quinlan, the prevailing ethical practice seems to be to
recognize that the dying are more often in need of comfort than treatment.
Recognition of the right to refuse necessary treatment in appropriate cir-
cumstances is consistent with existing medical mores. ...
370 N.E.2d at 426. "[P]hysicians have begun to realize that in many cases the effect of
using extraordinary measures to prolong life is 'only to prolong suffering, isolate the
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When a doctor has informed the patient of the risks involved in
treatment, the ultimate treatment decision rests with the pa-
tient.43 It seems, therefore, that it is unnecessary for the state to
protect the medical profession. The integrity of the doctor and
the medical profession is not impaired by a patient's informed
decision. Because the medical profession apparently does not
believe that its integrity is being impaired, an argument that the
state has an interest in preserving that integrity is not persuasive.
"The fourth asserted state interest in overriding a patient's
decision about his medical treatment is the interest in protecting
innocent third parties who may be harmed by the patient's
treatment decision.' " 44 It is in this area that the state's interest
most often has been deemed to outweigh the patient's right to
privacy. 45 Competent adults have been forced, against their will,
to undergo medical procedures when they jeopardized public
health46 or posed a risk to prison security.47 In Application of
President and Directors of Georgetown College, Inc.,48 the mother
of a seven month old baby, because of her responsibility to the
baby and to the community, was forced to have a blood trans-
fusion despite her religious objections to this procedure. 49
family from their loved one at a time when they may be close at hand or result in
economic ruin for the family.' " Id. at 423 (citing Lewis, Machine Medicine and It's
Relation to the Fatally Ill, 206 J. A.M.A. 387 (1968)).
The physician's role toward the terminally ill was formulated by the American
Medical Association: "The social commitment of the physician is to prolong life and
relieve suffering. Where the observance of one conflicts with the other, the physician,
patient and/or family of the patient have the discretion to resolve the conflict." JUDIcIAL
COUNCIL, CURRENT OPINIONS OF THE JUDICIAL CouNcIL OF THE AmERicAN MEDICAL
AssOCIATION, AmERIcAN MEDICAL AssOcIATION, CHICAGO (1982) at 9 (cited in PRESI-
DENT'S COMIussION REPORT, supra note 2, at 31-32).
41 See notes 52-74 infra and accompanying text.
" 486 A.2d at 1225.
41 Id. at 1225-26.
46 Graybeal v. McNevin, 439 S.W.2d 323 (Ky. 1969) (flouridation of water systems
held valid on basis that Board of Health determined it was in public interest, despite
claim that it violated right to religious freedom).
41 Commissioner of Correction v. Myers, 399 N.E.2d 452 (Mass. 1979) (prisoner
forced to undergo dialysis rather than be transferred to lower security prison).
- 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964).
4 The mother was a Jehovah's Witness, the teachings of which prohibit the
injection of blood into the body. See id. at 1002.
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The right to privacy and self-determination generally have
been held to outweigh competing state interests. 0 Because courts
have raised the right to privacy (thus the right to choose to die)
to a constitutional level, the legislature must formulate clear
standards regarding how this right can be exercised." This can
and should be done through the adoption of a living will statute.
B. Informed Consent
Under the doctrine of informed consent, "no medical pro-
cedure may be performed without a patient's consent, obtained
after explanation of the nature of the treatment, substantial
risks, and alternative therapies.' '52 Informed consent protects the
patient's right to privacy 3 but a person's "ability to control his
bodily integrity through informed consent is significant only
when one recognizes that this right also encompasses a right to
informed refusal.' '- Without the ability to refuse treatment,
consent has no meaning. If the patient cannot refuse treatment,
why "inform him" at all?
Luis Kutner has advocated the use of the living will for many
years. 5  He proposed a document which "would provide that if
the individual's bodily state becomes completely vegetative and
it is certain that he cannot regain his mental and physical ca-
!0 486 A.2d at 1225. See also Bartling v. Superior Court of Cal., 209 Cal. Rptr.
220, 224-26 (1984) (states' interests do not prevail over the right of a competent adult
to choose to die by refusing to continue life support systems).
It The legislature has the power to make laws for the public health, safety and
welfare. Legislation would also provide a clear and helpful framework for the courts.
Note, The Tragic Choice: Termination of Care for Patients in a Permanent Vegetative
State, 51 N.Y.U. L. REv. 285, 297-98 (1976).
12 486 A.2d at 1222 (quoting Cantor, A Patient's Decision to Decline Life Saving
Medical Treatment: Bodily Integrity Versus the Preservation of Life, 26 RuTGERs L.
Rav. 228, 237 (1973)).
11 "The doctrine ... is a primary means ... to protect this personal interest in
the integrity of one's body." Id.
4 Id. (citing Note, Informed Consent and the Dying Patient, 83 YALE L.J. 1632,
1648 (1974)); Kutner, supra note 10, at 47 ("Hence if courts take Informed Consent
seriously they must recognize the right of a competent patient to forego treatment.")
(emphasis in original).
-1 Luis Kutner is a member of the Illinois and Indiana Bars, is a former Visiting
Associate Professor at Yale Law School and was Chairman of the World Habeas Corpus
Committee. Kutner first proposed the living will in 1969 in an article entitled Due
Process of Euthanasia: The Living Will, a Proposal, 44 IND. L.J. 539 (1969).
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pacities, medical treatment shall cease.' '56 In making the pro-
posal for the living will, Kutner stated: "The essence of the
Living Will is Informed Consent of the person prior to the status
of irreversibility of dying or being maimed." ' 57 Kutner reasoned
that informed consent is an exercise of the right of privacy that
"should not be interfered with. ' 58
The doctrine of informed consent is a part of the contractual
nature of the physician/patient relationship. 9 Once the patient
seeks a physician's services and the physician accepts, the phy-
sician has a duty to continue treatment until the physician/
patient relationship is terminated60 Although the physician has
this duty, he is liable for battery if he performs treatment
without the patient's informed consent. 61
When an individual is unable to consent, as in an emergency
situation, the physician must assume that the patient would want
measures taken to preserve his life. 62 What if this assumption is
incorrect? The living will is useful in this situation. A living will
allows a person to sign a document indicating the extent to
which he would consent to medical treatment in the event that
he becomes unable to express himself on the issue.6 3
Commentators have criticized living wills stating that due to
their speculative nature they cannot possibly represent informed
consent. 4 But by directing in advance the preference not to have
56 Kutner, supra note 10, at 48.
17 Id. at 46.
58 Id.
Note, supra note 3, at 491-94.
10 Id. at 492. Doan v. Griffith, 402 S.W.2d 855 (Ky. 1966) (affirming rule that a
physician is under the duty to give his patient all necessary and continued attention as
long as the case requires it).
61 See generally W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 18,
at 114-18 (5th ed. 1984).
62 KEETON, supra note 61, at 117 ("[I]t has often been asserted that a physician
or other provider of health care has implied consent to deliver medical services ... to
a patient in an emergency."); Kutner, supra note 10, at 47; Note, Statutory Recognition,
supra note 37, at 163; Note, supra note 3, at 494.
63 Kutner, supra note 10, at 47-48. Accord Note, Statutory Recognition, supra
note 37, at 163-64.
' It has been contended that an ordinary person could not understand
the type of treatment he would want when dying. [footnote omitted] As
Dr. Austin Kutscher has noted: "An individual signs it under circumstances
when he is not concerned with his own death. It becomes operative at a
[VOL. 75
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extraordinary65 measures taken to preserve his life, a patient
implicitly understands and acknowledges that he is making this
decision without knowing exactly what may happen to him in
the future.6 This procedure is consistent with informed consent
because "[v]oluntary execution of a binding power directive
would provide conclusive evidence that the individual has weighed
the factors favoring and opposing an 'incompletely' informed
consent and has chosen to remove the decision to prolong his
life from the physician's discretion." 67 It is also consistent with
informed consent: the medical judgment of the patient's condi-
tion as terminal is left with the physician; the decision of whether
medical treatment will continue is left where it should be-with
the patient. 61
The informed consent doctrine should not be limited to the
non-terminal patient.69 The principle of self-determination, which
underlies the doctrine of informed consent, 70 should be extended
to the terminal patient as well. The patient's decision of whether
to institute extraordinary medical procedures, which merely post-
pone death, can and should be made prior to his incapacity.7'
The ability to give informed consent in advance can and should
be permitted through the use of a living will. The living will,
however, must be legitimized through a statute which recognizes
time when he is 100 percent involved."
Note, supra note 3, at 515 (citing Dempsey, The Living Will-And the Will to Live,
N.Y. Times, June 23, 1974, § 6 (Magazine), at 12). See also Kamisar, supra note 6.
1 Ordinary means are "all medicines, treatments and operations which offer
a reasonable hope of benefit, and which can be obtained and used without
excessive expense, pain, or other inconvenience," while extraordinary means
are "those which do involve these factors, or which, if used, would not
offer a reasonable hope of benefit."
Note, supra note 3, at 495 (quoting N. ST. Joaz-STEvAs, Lisa, DEATH AND THE LAW
275-76 (1961)). See also, Foody v. Manchester Memorial Hosp., 482 A.2d 713, 719
(Conn. 1984) ("Ordinary care is obligatory ... extraordinary care is optional.").
' Note, Statutory Recognition, supra note 37, at 164. Cf. Kutner, supra note 10
at 49-50 (patient via living will recognizes that he desires non-heroic treatment at time
when actual consent would be impossible); Note, supra note 3, at 515-16.
Note, Statutory Recognition, supra note 37, at 164.
Id.
o If this decision cannot be made in advance, the person who becomes incapable
of giving informed consent is deprived of his right to do so. See note 66 supra.
See text accompanying note 54 supra.
" See note 66 supra and accompanying text.
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its validity or it will not be legally binding. In the absence of a
statute, the living will is merely evidence of the individual's
intent 72 and may be morally persuasive to the family and the
physician but is not binding on them.73 The physician and the
patient, however, need legal protection for their decisions. This
protection can come only by making living wills legally binding
and effective. 74
II. THE STATUTE
A. Living Will Statutes in General
Although courts have been willing to allow a person to
discontinue life prolonging measures, on the basis of either the
right to privacy 75 or the informed consent doctrine, 76 the statu-
tory approach to solving the right to die problem is best. 77 The
adoption of a living will statute provides certainty regarding how
a person can exercise his right to die a natural death.7
The statutory solution, first used by California in 1977, 79 has
been adopted in a number of states.80 The California statute
72 486 A.2d at 1229 and n.5.
73 Comment, Living Wills-A Need for Statewide Legislation, supra note 1, at
816; Comment, The Right to Die a Natural Death and the Living Will, 13 TEx. TEcH.
L. REv. 99, 126 (1982).
74 The physician would be protected and not be held liable for his decision to
follow the directive and the patient would have his right to make this decision safe-
guarded. See Note, supra note 3, at 525; note 73 supra.
71 Tune v. Walter Reed Army Medical Hosp., 602 F. Supp. 1452 (D.D.C. 1985);
Bartling v. Superior Court of Cal., 209 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1984); Satz v. Perlmutter, 362
So. 2d 160 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978); In re L.H.R., 321 S.E.2d 716 (Ga. 1984); In re
Spring, 405 N.E.2d 115 (Mass. 1980); Superintendent of Belchertown State School v.
Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977); In re Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332 (Minn. 1984);
In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976).
76 370 N.E.2d 417; 486 A.2d 1209; In re Quackenbush, 383 A.2d 785 (N.J. Cty.
Ct. 1978).
7 See note 9 supra.
71 Note, The Legal Aspects of the Right to Die: Before and After the Quinlan
Decision, 65 Ky. L.J. 823, 872 (1976-77).
7" CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185-7195.
0 ALA. CODE §§ 22-8A-1 to -10 (1984); AmuZ. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-3201 to -
3210 (1986); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 82-3801 to -3804 (Cum. Supp. 1985); CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE §§ 7185 - 7195 (West Cum. Supp. 1985); CoLo. REv. STAT. §§ 15-18-101
to -113 (Supp. 1985); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 85-606, §§ I - 6 (Supp. 1986); DEL. CODE
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probably was precipitated by the In re Quinlan decision.8' After
California adopted a living- will statute, other states soon fol-
lowed. 2 Between 1977 and 1979 interest in the issue appears to
have waned: no new statutes were adopted during this period."3
The number of statutes recently adopted, however, indicates an
apparent resurgence of interest in the issue . 4
The adopted states' statutes vary in content. Some of the
provisions of these statutes should be included in any proposed
or adopted living will statute. Other provisions require refine-
ment. Certain provisions are not found in all statutes, but are
important enough to merit inclusion in any legislation passed by
the Kentucky General Assembly. The following discussion indi-
cates which provisions should be included in the statute and the
reasons for their inclusion.
ANN. tit. 16, §§ 2501 - 2508 (1983); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 6-2421 to -2430 (Cum. Supp.
1985); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 765.01 - .15 (west 1986); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 31-32-1 to -12
(1985); IDAHO CODE §§ 39-4501 to -4508 (1985); Iu. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, §§ 701 -
710 (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1985); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 16-08-11-1 to -11-22 (Burns
Supp. 1986); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 144A.1 - .11 (West Cum. Supp. 1986); KAN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 65-28,101 - 28,109 (1980); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 1299.58.1 - .10 (West Cum.
Supp. 1986); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 2921 - 2931 (Supp. 1985); MD. PUB.
HEATH CODE Am. §§ 5-601 to -614 (Supp. 1986); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 41-41-101 to -
121 (Cum. Supp. 1985); Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 459.010 - .055 (Supp. 1986); MONT. CODE
ANN. §§ 50-9-101 to -206 (1985); NEV. REv. STAT. §§ 449.540 - .690 (1983); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 137-H:1 to -H:16 (Supp. 1985); N.J. REv. STAT. §§ 52:9Y-1 to -6 (1986)
(statute creates commission); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-7-1 to -11 (Cum. Supp. 1981);
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-320 to -323 (1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, §§ 3101 - 3111
('Vest Supp. 1986); OR. REv. STAT. §§ 97.050 - .090 (1981); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 32-
11-101 to -110 (Supp. 1986); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4590h, §§ I - 11 (Vernon
Cum. Supp. 1985); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 75-2-1101 to -1118 (Supp. 1986); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 18, §§ 5251 - 5262 (Cum. Supp. 1985); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54.-325.8:1 - .8:13
(Cum. Supp. 1986); WASH. REv. CODE §§ 70.122.010 - .122.905 (1985); W. VA. CODE
§§ 16-30-1 to -10 (1985); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 154.01 - .15 (West Cum. Supp. 1986);
Wyo. STAT. §§ 33-26-144 to -152 (Cum. Supp. 1986).
11 "In re Quinlan was decided by the New Jersey Supreme Court on March 31,
1976. The California Natural Death Act was enacted on September 30, 1976 and became
effective on January 1, 1977." Comment, Living Wills-A Need for Statewide Legisla-
tion, supra note 1, at 800 n.127. See also Martyn & Jacobs, supra note 4, at 787-88.
12 At the end of 1977, seven other states had enacted similar statutes: Arkansas,
Idaho, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oregon, and Texas. Comment, Living
Wills-A Need for Statewide Legislation, supra note 1, at 800.
1 No other statutes were adopted until 1979 when Kansas and Washington enacted
statutes. Id.
14 Fifteen states have either adopted a statute during 1985 or the statutes became
effective in 1985. See note 80 supra.
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B. Analysis of Statutory Provisions
More than half of the statutes already in existence begin with
a statement of legislative findings or general legislative intent. 5
This section of the statute indicates to patients, physicians and
courts the legislature's intent regarding when the statute is to be
applied. 86 A statement of legislative intent would be especially
appropriate for a living will statute in Kentucky, because there
generally are no recorded legislative histories in Kentucky 7
As proposed by Kutner, 88 the living will document should
parallel the procedural requirements of a last will and testa-
ment.89 The document should state the intentions of the individ-
ual who executes it and should be attested by at least two
competent witnesses. 90 These procedural requirements put the
declarant on notice that the document is important and should
be taken seriously.9'
,1 Twenty of the thirty-seven states and the District of Columbia have this state-
ment at the beginning of the statute. Some have titled it a "statement of policy" and
others have titled it a "directive." ALA. CODE § 22-8A-2 (legislative intent); ARiz. Ray.
STAT. ANN. (legislative findings included in historical note); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE § 7186 (legislative findings and declaration); CoLo. REv. STAT. § 15-18-102 (leg-
islative declaration); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.02 (policy statement); GA. CODE ANN. §
31-32-1 (legislative findings); IDAHO CODE § 39-4502 (statement of policy); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 110 1/2, § 701 (purpose); IOWA CODE ANN. § 144A.1 (policy statement in
footnote); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-28, 101 (legislative findings and declaration); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 1299.58.1 (legislative purpose, findings and intent); Miss. CODE ANN. §
41-41-101 (legislative purpose); N.H. REv. STAT. .AN. § 137-H:1 (purpose and policy);
N.J. REv. STAT. § 52:9Y-1 (legislative findings and declarations); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
90-320 (general purpose); TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-11-102 (legislative intent); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 75-2-1102 (intent statement); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5251 (purpose and policy);
VA. CODE ANN. § 54-325.8:1 (policy statement); WAsH. REv. CODE § 70.122.010 (legis-
lative findings).
86 The legislative intent section of the statute is beneficial to patients and physicians
because it indicates when the statute is applicable. The legislative intent is also helpful
to courts asked to interpret the statute when questions arise concerning its application.
See Comment, Living Wills-A Need for Statewide Legislation, supra note 1, at 801.
17 Kentucky has no real legislative histories available because very few reports
containing committee discussion are published.
u Kutner, supra note 10, at 48.
19 See also Brown & Truitt, Euthanasia and the Right to Die, 3 Oto N.U.L. REv.
615, 639 (1975-76); Martyn & Jacobs, supra note 4, at 789 ("All statutory provisions
establishing the use of Living Wills adopt the same procedural requirements as those
found in testamentary will provisions."); Note, supra note 3, at 509.
10 Brown & Truitt, supra note 89, at 639; Kutner, supra note 10, at 48; Note,
supra note 3, at 509-10.
91 Martyn & Jacobs, supra note 4, at 789.
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Because informed consent depends on the individual's ability
to make a decision based on all the facts,92 the individual should
be competent 93 and able to make a rational, informed decision 94
at the time the document is executed. "The test of competency
is the same as that used to determine the capacity of an individ-
ual to execute an agreement ... whether the person ... pos-
sessed sufficient reason to understand the nature, terms and
effect of the agreement. ' 95 The question is not whether the
individual makes a decision that others feel is rational, but
whether he had the capacity to make such a decision even though
others may disagree with it.96
Another requirement that should be included in the statute
is that the person issuing the directive be an "adult." 97 Some
statutes define adult as a person eighteen years old or older, 98
while others simply have the word "adult" in the statute without
defining the term.99 Because at eighteen years of age a person
'2 See text accompanying notes 52-74 supra.
" For a discussion of incompetent patients, see notes 100-02 infra and accompa-
nying text.
94 Cf. 486 A.2d at 1222 (discussing general requirements for informed consent in
treatment refusal situations).
"' Kutner, supra note 10, at 46.
' Id.
" ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82-3803 allows a directive to be issued by others, ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 110 1/2, § 703(a) allows emancipated minors to issue a directive, N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 24-7-4 & LA. RE,. STAT. ANN. § 1299.58.6 allow a directive to be issued for
terminally ill minors. MD. PuB. HEALTH CODE ANN. § 5-602(a) allows anyone qualified
to make a will to issue a directive & TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-11-103(1) allows anyone
able to understand and appreciate the nature of the decision to issue a directive. These
are the only states that do not have the strict adult requirement.
11 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3201(5); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-18-103(1); D.C.
CODE ANN. § 6-2422(a); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-32-2(2); IDAHO CODE § 39-4503(3); IND.
CODE ANN. § 16-8-11-11(a); IowA CODE ANN. § 144A.2(l); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. §
2922(1); Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-41-105; Mo. REV. STAT. tit. 22, § 459.010(2); N.H. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 137-H:3; OR. REv. STAT. § 97.050(5); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-1103(3);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5253; W. VA. CODE § 16-30-3(a); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 154.03.
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, § 3102(5) defines adult as a person 21 years of age or older.
91 ALA. CODE § 22-8A-4(a); CA4u9. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7188; CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. P.A. 85-606, § 6; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 2503; FLA. STAT. ANN. §
765.04(l); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-28,103(a); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 1299.58.3(A)(1);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-9-103(l); NEV. REV. STAT. § 449.600; TEx. REv. CIrv. STAT.
ANN. art. 4590h, § 3; VA. CODE ANN. § 54-325.8:3; WASH. REV. CODE § 70.122.030;
Wyo. STAT. § 33-26-145(a). ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82-3802 & N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-
321(a)(1) have the word "person" in their statute. MD. PUB. HEALTH CODE ANN. § 5-
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generally is deemed to be capable of contracting with others and
able to make rational decisions, a living will statute should define
adult as such.
The statute also should provide for the rights of those under
the age of eighteen, and for those adjudged incompetent. The
General Assembly should recognize, as have many courts,100 that
the right to make determinations concerning treatment can be
transferred to a guardian or parent 01 and do not cease to exist
merely because the patient is a minor or incompetent. A special
provision in the statute should make this clear. In the case of a
minor, a provision giving the minor a chance to be adjudged
competent to make this decision would afford additional protec-
tion. 102
Another important requirement of the statute is a provision
regarding pregnant women. If a woman is pregnant when the
living will becomes operative, the terms of the will should not
be followed during her pregnancy. 10 3 The state's interest in pre-
602(a) defines adult as an individual qualified to make a will & N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-
7-3(A) defines adult as a person having reached the age of majority.
110 405 N.E.2d 115 (right to refuse treatment may be exercised through "substituted
judgment" by a guardian); 357 N.W.2d 332 (conservator authorized to order removal
despite lack of specific provision in statutes allowing it); 486 A.2d 1209 (guardian allowed
to make decision if either of two tests are met). Cf. 370 N.E.2d 417 (judiciary must
make final decision of whether duty can be delegated); In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64
(N.Y.) (state cannot delegate parens patriae duty over those who have never clearly
expressed wishes), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981).
11 A competent adult has the right to refuse medical treatment....
We now hold that this right rises to the level of a constitutional right
which is not lost because of the incompetence or youth of the patient....
We conclude that the right to refuse treatment or indeed to terminate
treatment may be exercised by the parents or legal guardian of the infant.
321 S.E.2d at 722.
1o2 See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, § 703 ("An individual of sound mind
and having reached the age of majority or having obtained the status of an emancipated
person pursuant to the 'Emancipation of Mature Minors Act' ... may execute a
document .... ).
30, ALA. CODE § 22-SA-4(a); ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-3205(D); CAL. HEALTH &
SAFnrY CODE § 7188 (included in directive); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. P.A. 85-606, § 5;
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 2503(d); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.08; GA. CODE ANN. §§ 31-
32-3(b) (in directive), & 31-32-8(a)(1); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, § 703(c); IND. CODE
ANN. § 16-8-11-11(d); IowA CODE ANN. § 144A.6(2); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-28,103(a);
MD. PuB. HEALTH CODE ANN. § 5-605(2); Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-41-107(1) (included in
directive); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-9-202(3); Nay. REV. STAT. § 449.610 (included in
directive); TEx. Rav. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590h, § 3 (included in directive); UTAH
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serving the life of the unborn fetus' °4 should override the wishes
and intent of the mother, expressed in the living will, at least
during the course of the pregnancy. The state's interest should
prevail because it cannot be assumed that, if the patient were
able to communicate her wishes, she would want to terminate
her life support during her pregnancy. 05 The state may also have
an interest in keeping the mother alive if the baby can survive
because the child will need the mother. °6 If, however, the moth-
er's situation is unchanged after the child's birth, her wish to
have medical treatment terminated should be granted.
All living will statutes should have a provision stating that
the physician and the hospital shall not be held civilly or crim-
inally responsible for carrying out the wishes of the patient as
expressed and directed in the living will document. 0 7 Without
this provision some physicians or hospitals would refuse to fol-
low the document's directive for fear of prosecution.0 8 Similarly,
many of the statutes also provide that when a physician refuses
CODE ANN. § 75-2-1109; WASH. REv. CODE § 70.122.030(1) (included in directive); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 154.03 (included in directive).
', Although abortions have been legal since Roe, the state does have an interest in
the life of the unborn fetus during the third trimester of pregnancy. See note 18 supra.
"I If the unborn fetus has reached the point of viability-the point at which the
fetus could live outside the womb-the mother legally could not choose to die and thus
abort the fetus.
'- Application of President and Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d
1000, 1008 (1964).
"I' ALA. CODE § 22-8A-7; ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-3205(c); ARK. STAT. ANN.
§ 82-3804; CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7190; COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-18-110(l)(b);
CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. P.A. 85-606, § 2; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 2505(a); D.C.
CODE ANN. § 6-2427(a); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.10(1); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-32-7; IDAHO
CODE § 39-4507; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, § 707; IND. CODE AnN. § 16-8-11-14(d)(2);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 144A.9; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-28,106; LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §
1299.58.8(A)(1)-(2); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2927; MD. PUB. HEALTH CODE ANN.
§ 5-607(c); MIss. CODE ANN. § 41-41-117(1); Mo. REv. STAT. § 459.040; MONT. CODE
ANN. § 50-9-204(1)-(2); NEv. REv. STAT. § 449.630; N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 137-H:9;
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-7-7; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-321(h); OK1A. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, §
3106; OR. REV. STAT. § 97.065(2); TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-11-110(h); TEx. REv. Civ.
STAT. ANN. art. 4590h, § 6; UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-1114; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §
5259; VA. CODE ANN. § 54-325.8:8; WASH. Rnv. CODE § 70.122.060(2); W. VA. CODE
§ 16-30-7(a); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 154.07; WYo. STAT. § 33-26-149.
"I It should be noted, however, ". . . apparently no prosecutor has proceeded to
trial where a physician chose to terminate life-preserving treatment or omit emergency
treatment in a hopeless case." 405 N.E.2d at 121 (citation omitted). See also PREsmETr's
CosssloN REPORT, supra note 2, at 34-37.
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to follow the directive he should not be held liable, but rather
should be required to transfer the patient to a physician who
will carry out the patient's wishes.'09 This provision is necessary,
because if the physician is allowed to ignore the directive, the
patient's intent and the legal effect of the living will are frus-
trated.
To resolve the controversy surrounding the right to die and
the exercise of this right, legislation recognizing living wills should
be adopted in Kentucky. Legalizing the living will should alle-
viate the burdens on the courts and guarantee a terminally ill
person his right of privacy and the ability to make his own
health care decisions.
The following is a statute proposed for adoption by the
Kentucky General Assembly. Portions of the statute are taken
from other states' statutes and other portions are from the
statute proposed by Gerta Bendl." 0
109 ALA. CODE § 22-8A-8(a); ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-3204(B); CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 7191(b); COLO. REv. STAT. § 15-18-113(5); D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-2427(b);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.09; GA. CODE ANN. § 31-32-8(b)(1); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/
2, § 706(c); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-8-11-14(e); IowA CODE ANN. § 144A.8; KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 65-28,107(a); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 1299.58.7(B); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit.
22, § 2926; MD. PUB. HEALTH CODE ANN. § 5-604(b); MLss. CODE ANN. § 41-41-115(2);
Mo. REv. STAT. § 459.030; N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 137-H:6(II); OxA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 60, § 3107(B); OR. REv. STAT. § 97.070(3); TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-11-108(a); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 75-2-1112(2); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5256; VA. CODE ANN. § 54-
325.8:7; WASH. REv. CODE § 70.122.060(2); W. VA. CODE § 16-30-7(b); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 154.07; Wyo. STAT. § 33-26-147.
In addition, CAL. HALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7191(b); COLO. REv. STAT. § 15-18-
113(5); D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-2427(b); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-28,107(a); Mo. REv. STAT.
§ 459.045(1); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, § 3107(B); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-1112(3); &
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 154.07 make the physician liable for unprofessional conduct for
refusing to follow the directive or transfer the patient to a doctor who will follow the
directive. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2928(1) provides that willful failure to transfer
the patient is a Class E crime. MD. PuB. HEALTH CODE ANN. § 5-607(a) subjects
physicians who refuse to transfer a patient to civil liability, while MONT. CODE ANN. §
50-9-206(1) treats the failure to transfer as a misdemeanor. Finally, TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 32-11-108 provides that a failure to make a good faith effort to transfer the patient
subjects the physician to civil liability and professional disciplinary action.
110 See note 8 supra. Unless otherwise indicated by footnotes, the statute proposed
by this Comment was taken from Gerta Bendl's proposed statute. Ms. Bendl's statute
was used because it is substantially similar to many of the state statutes already in force.
Portions of Ms. Bendi's statute were changed and taken from other statutes because in
the author's opinion they better express the propositions involved.
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C. The Proposed Statute
§ 1. The general assembly finds that all persons have the
fundamental right to control the decisions relating to their own
medical care, including the decision to have medical or surgical
means or procedures calculated to prolong their lives provided,
withheld or withdrawn."'
§ 2. In order that the rights of persons with such terminal
conditions may be respected even after they are no longer able
to participate actively in decisions concerning themselves, the
general assembly hereby declares that the laws of the Common-
wealth of Kentucky shall recognize the right of a person to make
a written declaration, at any time, instructing the person's phy-
sician to withhold or withdraw life-prolonging procedures in the
event such person is diagnosed as having a terminal condition.
§ 3. As used in this act:
(A) "Attending physician" means the physician who has
primary responsibility for the treatment and care of the patient.
(B) "Declaration" means a witnessed document in writing,
voluntarily made, at any time, by the declarant in accordance
with the requirements of § 4 of this act.
(C) "Life-prolonging procedure" means any medical pro-
cedure, treatment or intervention which (1) utilizes mechanical
or other artificial means to sustain, restore or supplant a
spontaneous vital function or is otherwise of such a nature as
to afford a patient no reasonable expectation of recovery from
a terminal condition and (2) when applied to a patient in a
terminal condition, would serve only to prolong the dying
process. "Life-prolonging procedure" shall not include the
administration of medication or the performance of any med-
ical procedure deemed necessary to provide comfort or suste-
nance care or to alleviate pain.
(D) "Physician" means a person licensed to practice med-
icine in the Commonwealth of Kentucky.
(E) "Qualified patient" means a patient who has:
(1)Made a declaration in accordance with this Act; and
I This section contains the legislative intent as discussed in notes 85-87 supra and
accompanying text. This section was included in the Bill proposed by Gerta BendI,




(2)Been diagnosed and certified in writing by the attending
and one other physician, as having a terminal condition.
(F) "Terminal condition" means a condition caused by
injury, disease or illness from which, to a reasonable degree
of medical certainty, there can be no recovery or death is
imminent and where the application of life-prolonging proce-
dures would serve only to artificially prolong the dying process.
§ 4. Any person who has attained the age of eighteen years
old or who has been adjudged by a court to be competent to
make the decision may make a written declaration directing the
withholding of life-prolonging procedures when such person is
diagnosed as having a terminal condition. The test for compe-
tency shall be whether the individual is able to understand and
appreciate the nature and consequences of the decision." 2
§ 5. A written declaration shall be signed by the declarant
in the presence of two subscribing witnesses."' In no instance
shall any of the following be a witness to any declaration made
under this act:
(a) A blood relative who would be a beneficiary of the
declarant; or
(b) A beneficiary of the declarant under descent and dis-
tribution statutes of the Commonwealth; or
(c) An employee of a health facility in which the declarant
is a patient; or
(d) An attending physician of the declarant; or
(e) Any person directly financially responsible for the de-
clarant's health care.
§ 6. It shall be the responsibility of the declarant to provide
for notification to the declarant's attending physician that a
declaration has been made. In the event the declarant is coma-
tose, incompetent or otherwise mentally or physically incapable,
any other person may notify the physician of the existence of a
declaration. An attending physician who is so notified shall
promptly make the declaration or a copy of the declaration a
part of the declarant's medical records.
,12 See, e.g., TEtN. CODE ANN. 32-11-103(l); Mo. R~v. STAT. § 459.010(2).
"I See notes 88-91 supra and accompanying text.
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§ 7. Life-prolonging procedures may be withheld or with-
drawn from an adult patient with a terminal condition who is
comatose, incompetent, or otherwise physically or mentally in-
capable of communication and has not made a declaration in
accordance with this act if there is a consultation and a written
agreement for the withholding or withdrawal of life-prolonging
procedures between the attending physician and any of the fol-
lowing individuals, who shall be guided by the express or implied
intentions of the patient, in the following order of priority if no
individual in a prior class is present:
(a) The judicially appointed guardian of the person if such
guardian has been appointed. This paragraph shall not be
construed to require such appointment before a treatment de-
cision can be made under this section.
(b) The patient's spouse.
(c) The parents of the patient." 4
§ 8. A declaration made pursuant to this act shall be in the
following form, and may include other specific directions if the
declarant so wishes. Should any other specific directions be held
to be invalid, such invalidity shall not affect the declaration.
DECLARATION
Declaration made this day of
I, , willfully and voluntarily make
known my desire that my dying shall not be artificially prolonged
under the circumstances set forth below, and do hereby declare:
If at any time I should have a terminal condition and my
attending and one (1) other physician have determined that there
can be no recovery from such condition and where the applica-
tion of life-prolonging procedures would serve only to artificially
prolong the dying process, I direct that such procedures be
withheld or withdrawn, and that I be permitted to die naturally
with only the administration of medication or the performance
of any medical procedure deemed necessary to provide me with
comfort or sustenance care or to alleviate pain.
'4 See, e.g., LA. STAT. ANN. § 1299.58.6; UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-1107(2)0b). See
notes 88-90 supra and accompanying text.
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In the absence of my ability to give directions regarding the
use of such life-prolonging procedures, it is my intention that
this declaration shall be honored by my family and attending
physician as the final expression of my legal right to refuse
medical or surgical treatment and accept the consequences for
such refusal.
If I have been diagnosed as pregnant and that diagnosis is
known to my physician, this directive shall have no force or
effect during the course of my pregnancy.
I understand the full import of this declaration and I am
emotionally and mentally competent to make this declaration.
Signed
The declarant is known to me and I believe the declarant to
be of sound mind.
Witness
Witness
§ 9. No declaration executed in accordance with the above,
shall be revoked except in the presence of two witnesses and:
(a) By some writing declaring an intention to revoke, which
writing shall be signed and dated by the declarant; or
(b) By an oral statement by the declarant of an intent to
revoke; or
(c) By the declarant or by some person in the declarant's
presence and at the declarant's direction, by cutting, tearing,
burning, obliterating, canceling, or destroying the declaration,
or the signature thereto, with the intent to revoke.
§ 10. An oral statement by the declarant to revoke a decla-
ration shall override any previous written declaration.
§ 11. Any such revocation shall become effective when com-
municated to the declarant's physician. The attending physician
shall record, in the declarant's medical record, the time, date
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and place when the physician received notification of the revo-
cation.
§ 12. The living will declaration of a person who is diagnosed
as pregnant by the attending physician shall have no effect
during the course of the pregnancy. 5
§ 13. A health care facility, physician or other person acting
under the direction of a physician shall not be subject to criminal
prosecution or civil liability or be deemed to have engaged in
unprofessional conduct as a result of the withholding or the
withdrawal of life-prolonging procedures from a patient with a
terminal condition in accordance with this act. A person who
authorizes the withholding or withdrawal of life-prolonging pro-
cedures from a patient with a terminal condition in accordance
with a qualified patient's declaration shall not be subject to
criminal prosecution or civil liability for such action 11 6
§ 14. The provisions in this section shall apply unless it is
shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the person au-
thorizing or effectuating the withholding or withdrawal of life-
prolonging procedures did not, in good faith, comply with the
provisions of this act. A declaration made in accordance with
this act shall be presumed to have been made voluntarily.
§ 15. An attending physician who refuses to comply with the
declaration of a qualified patient shall transfer the patient to
another physician who will carry out the declaration. Failure to
effect a transfer shall constitute unprofessional conduct. 1 7
§ 16. The withholding or withdrawal of life-prolonging pro-
cedures from a qualified patient in accordance with the provi-
sions of this act shall not, for any purpose, constitute a suicide.
No policy of life insurance shall be legally impaired or invali-
dated by the withholding or withdrawal of life-prolonging pro-
cedures from an insured qualified patient, notwithstanding any
term of the policy to the contrary.
§ 17. Any person who willfully conceals, cancels, defaces,
or damages the declaration of another without the declarant's
consent or who falsifies or forges a revocation of the declaration
" See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 16-8-11-11(d).
116 See notes 107-08 supra and accompanying text.
"' See, e.g., CoLo. Rav. STAT. § 15-18-113(5).
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of another, thereby causing life-prolonging procedures to be
utilized in contravention of the previously expressed intent of
the patient, shall be civilly liable.
§ 18. Any person who falsifies or forges the declaration of
another, or willfully conceals or withholds personal knowledge
of the revocation of a declaration, with the intent to cause a
withholding or withdrawal of life-prolonging procedures, con-
trary to the wishes of the declarant, and thereby, because of
such act, directly causes life-prolonging procedures to be with-
held or withdrawn and death to be hastened, shall be guilty of
a felony.
CONCLUSION
A number of courts have extended the right of privacy to
include the right to refuse medical treatment." 8 This right has
been extended further by some courts to allow the right to
withdraw medical treatment when the patient has no hope of
recovery." 9 Enforcement of this right in court, however, takes a
lot of time, a lot of money and in some cases the patient may
die before the case is finally adjudicated. The legislature, there-
fore, should enact the living will statute as a means to effectuate
a recognized right. Allowing a patient to express this right be-
forehand will save the family from unnecessary agony and the
expense of going to court. It also removes the decision from the
physician and the family and leaves it where it should be, with
the patient.
Michelle Coulter Landers
See note 20 supra.
119 See Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 497 N.E.2d 626 (Mass. 1986)
wherein the Massachusetts Supreme Court recently went farther than any other court
has gone in allowing medical treatment to be withdrawn from a patient. Mr. Brophy
was in a persistent vegetative state and was getting nutrition through a gastronomy tube.
His family wanted the tube removed. Id. at 628. The court held that Mr. Brophy had
a right to have the tube removed and therefore he had to be transferred to a hospital
that would carry out his wishes. Id. at 639.
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